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Save the date: 60 Jahre BRD in der NATO

No to NATO - Σάβ, 28/03/2015 - 09:46
6. Mai 1955 bis 2015
Herausforderungen für Friedenspolitik und Friedensbewegung Wann: Freitag 15. und Samstag 16. Mai 2015 Wo: Universitätsclub, Konviktstraße 9, 53113 Bonn Wer: Internationales Netzwerk „No to war – no to NATO“ in Zusammenarbeit mit der Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung

Das Programm gibt es die nächsten Tagen hier.


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  • Spenden und finanzielle Unterstützungsbeiträge der Teilnehmenden bitte an:
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      Verwendungszweck: NATO 60

NATO: Aufrüstung gegen Russland

IMI Tübingen - Σάβ, 28/03/2015 - 01:26
Die Zeitung gegen den Krieg, in der dieser Text erschienen ist, kann hier bestellt werden.   Tschechien wird vom 22. Juni bis 3. Juli 2015 mit mehr als 400 Soldaten gemeinsam mit den USA, Ungarn, Litauen und der Slowakei ein (…)

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New York Times Accidentally Undermines John Bolton “Bomb Iran” Op-Ed in Own Pages

The Intercept - Engl. - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 18:55

The New York Times yesterday published an op-ed by the characteristically bellicose John R. Bolton, headlined ‘To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran.’ Bolton, now a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the George W. Bush administration.

In an unusual touch, a link added to the original online edition of Bolton’s op-ed directly undermines Bolton’s case for war:

…Iran will not negotiate away its nuclear program. Nor will sanctions block its building a broad and deep weapons infrastructure. The inconvenient truth is that only military action like Israel’s 1981 attack on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak reactor in Iraq…can accomplish what is required.

U.S. and Israeli politicians often claim that Israel’s bombing of Iraq in 1981 significantly set back an already-existing Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The truth is almost exactly the opposite. Harvard Physics Professor Richard Wilson, who visited the ruins of Osirak in 1982 and followed the issue closely, has said the available evidence “suggests that the bombing did not delay the Iraqi nuclear-weapons program but started it.” This evidence includes the design of the Osirak reactor, which made it unsuitable for weapons production, and statements by Iraqi nuclear scientists that Saddam Hussein ordered them to begin a serious nuclear weapons program in response to the Israeli attack.

This perspective rarely appears in mainstream U.S. media outlets. One time it did, however, was in a 2012 Washington Post op-ed titled “An Israeli attack against Iran would backfire — just like Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq.”

And it was that Post op-ed to which the Times chose to link as backup for Bolton. In other words, anyone looking for additional facts about Bolton’s case were led to an explanation of how what Bolton was saying was factually wrong, and that following the advice of people like Bolton would be disastrous.

Sewell Chan, Deputy Editor of the Times op-ed section, said that the link was “mistakenly added by an editor, not the writer, during the fact-checking process.” The Times said it plans to replace the link with one sending readers to a Times news article.

Bolton helped force out José Bustani, director general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in 2002. According to Bustani and others, Bolton was infuriated that Bustani was making plans for his organization to determine whether Iraq still possessed chemical weapons, since it would undermine the Bush administration’s plans for war. Bolton also appears to have played a key role in the notorious U.S. claims that Iraq was seeking yellowcake uranium from Niger.

Bolton claimed in a 2002 speech that Cuba is making “at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort.” When a government intelligence analyst had disputed stronger language in Bolton’s original draft of his speech, Bolton and his staff berated him and attempted to have him removed from his job.

For its part, the Times famously helped the Bush administration make its case for invading Iraq by providing a conduit for false pre-war claims by government officials. (In addition, the Times’ 2002 story about Bolton’s Cuba speech was written by Judith Miller, the same reporter responsible for much of the Times’ worst coverage of Iraq.)

Photo: AP

The post New York Times Accidentally Undermines John Bolton “Bomb Iran” Op-Ed in Own Pages appeared first on The Intercept.

Jetzt erst recht: Aktiv werden gegen Kampfdrohnen!

IMI Tübingen - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 16:42
Über die Zeitung “BILD” erfuhren wir aus dem geheim tagenden Verteidigungsausschuss, dass die Bundesregierung angeblich plane, noch dieses Jahr bewaffnete Drohnen samt Munition anzuschaffen. Zuvor war wiederholt angekündigt worden, vor einer solchen Entscheidung eine breite gesellschaftliche Debatte über die hochumstrittenen (…)

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[Kolumbien] Zwei Versionen eines Militärübergriffs

Indymedia antimil - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 16:40
von: Kolumbien Info am: 27.03.2015 - 16:40

Zwei Versionen inklusive Video eines Militärübergriffs im kolumbianischen Cauca.

Exclusive: TSA’s Secret Behavior Checklist to Spot Terrorists

The Intercept - Engl. - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 14:59

Fidgeting, whistling, sweaty palms. Add one point each. Arrogance, a cold penetrating stare, and rigid posture, two points.

These are just a few of the suspicious signs that the Transportation Security Administration directs its officers to look out for — and score — in airport travelers, according to a confidential TSA document obtained exclusively by The Intercept.

The checklist is part of TSA’s controversial program to identify potential terrorists based on behaviors that it thinks indicate stress or deception — known as the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT. The program employs specially trained officers, known as Behavior Detection Officers, to watch and interact with passengers going through screening.

The document listing the criteria, known as the “Spot Referral Report,” is not classified, but it has been closely held by TSA and has not been previously released. A copy was provided to The Intercept by a source concerned about the quality of the program.

The checklist ranges from the mind-numbingly obvious, like “appears to be in disguise,” which is worth three points, to the downright dubious, like a bobbing Adam’s apple. Many indicators, like “trembling” and “arriving late for flight,” appear to confirm allegations that the program picks out signs and emotions that are common to many people who fly.

A TSA spokesperson declined to comment on the criteria obtained by The Intercept. “Behavior detection, which is just one element of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to mitigate threats against the traveling public, is vital to TSA’s layered approach to deter, detect and disrupt individuals who pose a threat to aviation,” a spokesperson said in an emailed statement.

Since its introduction in 2007, the SPOT program has attracted controversy for the lack of science supporting it. In 2013, the Government Accountability Office found that there was no evidence to back up the idea that “behavioral indicators … can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security.” After analyzing hundreds of scientific studies, the GAO concluded that “the human ability to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance.”

The inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security found in 2013 that TSA had failed to evaluate SPOT, and “cannot ensure that passengers at United States airports are screened objectively, show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program’s expansion.”

Despite those concerns, TSA has trained and deployed thousands of Behavior Detection Officers, and the program has cost more than $900 million since it began in 2007, according to the GAO.

The 92-point checklist listed in the “Spot Referral Report” is divided into various categories with a point score for each. Those categories include a preliminary “observation and behavior analysis,” and then those passengers pulled over for additional inspection are scored based on two more categories: whether they have “unusual items,” like almanacs and “numerous prepaid calling cards or cell phones,” and a final category for “signs of deception,” which include “covers mouth with hand when speaking” and “fast eye blink rate.

Points can also be deducted from someone’s score based on observations about the traveler that make him or her less likely, in TSA’s eyes, to be a terrorist. For example, “apparent” married couples, if both people are over 55, have two points deducted off their score. Women over the age of 55 have one pointed deducted; for men, the point deduction doesn’t come until they reach 65.

Last week, the ACLU sued TSA to obtain records related to its behavior detection programs, alleging that they lead to racial profiling. The lawsuit is based on a Freedom of Information Act request the ACLU filed last November asking for numerous documents related to the program, including the scientific justification for the program, changes to the list of behavior indicators, materials used to train officers and screen passengers, and what happens to the information collected on travelers.

“The TSA has insisted on keeping documents about SPOT secret, but the agency can’t hide the fact that there’s no evidence the program works,” said Hugh Handeyside, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project, in a statement announcing the lawsuit.

Being on the lookout for suspicious behavior is a “common sense approach” that is used by law enforcement, according to TSA. “No single behavior alone will cause a traveler to be referred to additional screening or will result in a call to a law enforcement officer (LEO),” the agency said in its emailed statement. “Officers are trained and audited to ensure referrals for additional screening are based only on observable behaviors and not race or ethnicity.”

One former Behavior Detection Officer manager, who asked not to be identified, said that SPOT indicators are used by law enforcement to justify pulling aside anyone officers find suspicious, rather than acting as an actual checklist for specific indicators. “The SPOT sheet was designed in such a way that virtually every passenger will exhibit multiple ‘behaviors’ that can be assigned a SPOT sheet value,” the former manager said.

The signs of deception and fear “are ridiculous,” the source continued. “These are just ‘catch all’ behaviors to justify BDO interaction with a passenger. A license to harass.”

The observations of a TSA screener or a Behavior Detection Officer shouldn’t be the basis for referring someone to law enforcement. “The program is flawed and unnecessarily delays and harasses travelers. Taxpayer dollars would be better spent funding real police at TSA checkpoints,” the former manager said.

A second former Behavior Detection Officer manager, who also asked not to be identified, told The Intercept that the program suffers from lack of science and simple inconsistency, with every airport training its officers differently. “The SPOT program is bullshit,” the manager told The Intercept. “Complete bullshit.”

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Photo: Mark Lennihan/AP

The post Exclusive: TSA’s Secret Behavior Checklist to Spot Terrorists appeared first on The Intercept.

Why Should Bergdahl Suffer More Than Generals Who Did Far Worse?

The Intercept - Engl. - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 14:02

What punishment should Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl receive for allegedly deserting his post in Afghanistan? The answer comes by asking another question: What punishment has been handed out to American generals and politicians whose incompetence caused far more bloodshed and grief than anything Bergdahl did?

A key thing about justice is that it should be fair–people should be punished no matter their rank or title. The problem with the bloodlust for more action against Bergdahl–beyond his five years of horrific suffering as a Taliban prisoner–is that inept generals, rather than being court-martialed or demoted or reprimanded, have been rewarded and celebrated despite their dereliction in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This duality is crystallized in a now-famous article written by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling in 2007 for Armed Forces Journal. After describing the failures of general officers after 9/11 as well as in the Vietnam war, Yingling, who served three tours in Iraq and is now a teacher in Colorado, wrote a stinging sentence about justice and responsibility in the military: “A private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.”

Let’s be clear about what it means to lose a war in the context of Iraq. It does not only mean that America failed to achieve its political or military goals. It means that more Americans and Iraqis lost their lives than needed to, and it means that war crimes were committed for which general officers bear command responsibility. Due to failures that Yingling and many others have noted—not anticipating the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, not recognizing the emergence of an insurgency, not figuring out the right strategy to respond to it—the war in Iraq ground on and the bloodshed has been enormous on all sides. Afghanistan is yet another graveyard of failures by general officers.

Two generals, in particular, have been criticized but not punished for serious mistakes that they and their subordinates made—Tommy Franks, who commanded U.S. forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and Ricardo Sanchez, who led U.S. forces in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The military writer Tom Ricks has done the best job so far of exposing their battlefield failures and the failure of our political and military leaders to do anything about it. Sanchez oversaw, among other disasters, the Abu Ghraib torture scandal, for which low-ranking soldiers were sternly punished, such as Specialist Lynndie England, who served a year and a half in prison for her role in abusing Iraqi detainees. Ricks has noted, in a startling case of military chutzpah, that Sanchez was indignant he didn’t receive an extra star for his Iraq service.

“As far as I can tell, no general has been fired for incompetence in combat since Maj. Gen. James Baldwin was fired as commander of the Americal Division in 1971,” Ricks has said. “Since then, others have been relieved for moral and ethical lapses that are embarrassing to the Army, but not, to my knowledge, for combat ineffectiveness.”

If firing generals for incompetence is too much to ask for, how about retiring them at a lower rank? As Yingling noted, “A general who presides over a massive human rights scandal or a substantial deterioration in security ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to suffer the same penalty.” Yet even that modest level of reprimand has almost never occurred. Holding generals to account for war crimes committed on their watch is like waiting for Haley’s comet–it happens with excruciating rarity.

Instead, dereliction is rewarded. In Oklahoma, for instance, there is the General Tommy Franks Leadership Institute and Museum. Franks is a frequent public speaker (here’s his bio at the speakers bureau that represents him) and was tapped as an adviser to presidential candidate Mitt Romney. In Texas, Sanchez was sufficiently celebrated and popular to mount a primary run for an open Senate seat (he pulled out before the election), he has a school named after him, and like so many other retired generals, he gives a lot of speeches to admiring audiences.

So we circle back to Bowe Bergdahl, who could spend the rest of his life in prison for desertion and misbehaving before the enemy, unless there is a plea deal. If he is guilty, he should be convicted. But punishment beyond his torment at the hands of the Taliban would be unfair, even if it is true, as some allege, that G.I.s were killed while searching for him. Whatever blood he might have on his hands–and it’s far from clear there’s any–is minor compared to the generals and politicians who made far graver errors. It would be particularly unfortunate if Bergdahl became another sort of pawn, this time in the partisan polemics over President Obama’s decision to exchange five Taliban prisoners for him.

I reported on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia and Sudan, so I understand the sense of betrayal among soldiers who served with Bergdahl, even if my understanding is that of a civilian who watched rather than fought. Their anger and desire for justice are not unreasonable. I share it, but my anger is directed upwards at the unpunished and unapologetic, rather than downwards at men and women who have suffered enough.

Photo: AP

The post Why Should Bergdahl Suffer More Than Generals Who Did Far Worse? appeared first on The Intercept.

Leiser Tod im Garten Eden - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 11:50

Unter dem Titel „Leiser Tod im Garten Eden – Die Folgen der Golfkriege“ läuft im Bayerischen Fernsehen eine sehenswerte Dokumentation an -

Von REDAKTION, 27. März 2013 -

Es ist ein Thema, das lange Zeit kaum Aufmerksamkeit erfahren hat. Am Mittwoch, den 1. April 2015, kommt nun endlich mit dem Dokumentarfilm „Leiser Tod im Garten Eden“ eine Recherche ins deutsche Fernsehen, die sich mit den Auswirkungen der Verwendung von Uran-Munition in den Irakkriegen befasst. Markus Matzel und Karin Leukefeld, die als Journalistin auch für Hintergrund tätig ist, haben sich auf die Suche nach den Folgen des Beschusses mit Uran-Munition gemacht.

Mittwoch, 01.04.2015


Im Stellvertreterkrieg - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 11:50

Überlegungen zur geostrategischen Rolle des Islamischen Staates -


„Der Islamische Staat im Irak und in Sham (Levante) kommt über Euch aus dem Nichts“. So steht es neuerdings an den Häusern von Christen in Qaryatayn. Die Stadt liegt etwa 150 km östlich von Homs, abseits der Wüstenstraße nach Palmyra. Gut 30 Prozent der  etwa 20 000 Einwohner von Qaryatayn gehören der Syrisch-Katholischen und Syrisch-Orthodoxen Kirche an, einer der ältesten Christengemeinden im Herzen Syriens. Die Schriften an den Mauern erschienen über Nacht, berichtet Pater Jacques Mourad, der das nahe


Die Rüstungsprojekte der Bundeswehr

IMI Tübingen - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 10:44
Dieser Text erschien in der Broschüre “Deutschland: Wi(e)der die Großmacht” (68 Seiten, DinA4), die zum Preis von 4 Euro unter bestellt werden kann. Hier die PDF-Version.   Derzeit laufen bei der Bundeswehr rund 2.300 Rüstungsvorhaben, darunter 700 Forschungsprojekte. “Die (…)

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Frontalangriff auf die Parlamentskontrolle

IMI Tübingen - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 10:34
Dieser Text erschien in der Broschüre “Deutschland: Wi(e)der die Großmacht” (68 Seiten, DinA4), die zum Preis von 4 Euro unter bestellt werden kann. Hier die PDF-Version.   Ich freue mich, dass wir uns auf diesem IMI-Kongress inhaltlich mit einem (…)

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Die Ukraine und EUropas Nachbarschaftspolitik

IMI Tübingen - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 10:13
Dieser Text erschien in der Broschüre “Deutschland: Wi(e)der die Großmacht” (68 Seiten, DinA4), die zum Preis von 4 Euro unter bestellt werden kann. Hier die PDF-Version.   Lautstark forderte Bundespräsident Joachim Gauck, flankiert von Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen (…)

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Antifaschist_innen gedachten der Befreiung Rüsselsheims am 25. März 1945

Indymedia antimil - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 09:24
von: Georgi K. Shukow am: 27.03.2015 - 09:24



Rüsselsheimer Antifaschist_innen haben am 25.März der Befreiung Rüsselsheims vom Faschismus vor 70 Jahren gedacht.



Die NATO-Sicherheitskonferenz und die Proteste 2001 bis jetzt

IMI Tübingen - Παρ, 27/03/2015 - 08:20
Dieser Text erschien in der Broschüre “Deutschland: Wi(e)der die Großmacht” (68 Seiten, DinA4), die zum Preis von 4 Euro unter bestellt werden kann. Hier ist die PDF-Version.   Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz startete bekanntlich als “Wehrkundetagung”, und der Ort war (…)

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